Last month , the U.S. Government Accountability Office issued a scathingreport : the system to defend the U.S. from ballistic missiles does n’t form , and probably never will . But it induce unsound . Congress thenvotedto expand the broken system , allocating money for a unexampled , sub - par missile defence site . How did this happen ?
It ’s the latest iteration of federally - fund cognitive dissonance that has been go on for years . In possibility , the U.S. Ground - Based Midcourse Defense ( GMD ) system of rules — which is superintend by the Missile Defense Agency — should be up to of launch projectile interceptors , each tip with a “ kill vehicle ” that detaches , detects and destroys the incoming threat . In the real world , earth - base missile defence force has break all three of its flight tests since 2010 .
Yet , the United States preserve building it . Thus far , 30 interceptor missile have been deployed at Fort Greeley , Alaska , and Vandenberg Air Force Base , California . The Pentagon says it plans to deploy another 14 interceptor in Alaska by 2017 . However , additional flight of steps examination stand for to show the organization ’s capabilities and limitations is not scheduled to be completed until at least 2022 .
After reviewing a report from the Department of Defense , which advise an accelerated testing schedule , the Government Accountability Office , which acts as the investigative sleeve of Congress , conclude :
Since 2003 , we have establish this overture of concurrently manufacturing , deploy , and examination interceptor is high hazard because exam may uncover issues requiring costly design change and retrofit programs … .
It is improbable that DOD can successfully speed the tread of GMD ’s examination given its testing track platter and the increasing complexity of plan test …
In plus , the report provided deficient information to assess whether accelerating GMD ’s examination pace is prudent because it did not address the likely full cost , welfare , and risks of accelerate examination .
rendering : It ’s broken , the Defense Department has no clear thought how to specify it and throw more money at this job will only dig us in deeper . The GAO has calculate that , by 2017 , the GMD system will cost taxpayers more than $ 40 billion .
And now Congress wants to break priming coat on a third siteon or nearthe East Coast — the military eq of a span to nowhere .
Hello? Is This Thing On?
What make this worse — yes , there ’s always a “ worse”—is that the GAO was not the first , but the third government authority in late years to close that GMD was in need of a complete redevelopment . In 2012 , The National Academy of Sciences ’ National Research Council publish a 260 - pagestudy , saying that the Missile Defense Agency ’s efforts “ have spawned an almost ‘ hobby shop ’ coming , with many false starts on badly analyzed concepts . ” The Pentagon ’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation issued a report in February 2014 , raising doubts about the “ lustiness ” of the applied science .
In fact , a researcher at the National Center for Arms Control and Non - Proliferation look back previous editions of that Pentagon report andculled togetherthe following quotation mark :
2011 : “ To date , GMD has demonstrated a circumscribed capability against a mere threat . ”
2010 : “ To date , GMD has demonstrated a special capability against a simple threat . ”
2009 : “ To date , GMD has certify a limited capability against a childlike threat . ”
2008 : “ While GMD has demonstrated a capableness against a simple foreign threat , GMD flight examination to engagement will not support a eminent stage of sureness in its limited potentiality . ”
2007 : “ To day of the month , GMD certify a circumscribed capability against a unsubdivided strange threat . GMD flight of steps testing to appointment is not sufficient to provide a high level of statistical confidence in its circumscribed capabilities . ”
2006 : “ The program still need extra flight test datum under stressing conditions to formalise models and simulations and to increase sureness in the models , simulations , and assessment of scheme capability . ”
How bad is this ? It ’s so bad that an independent follow-up panel commissioned by the government oncerecommendedreducing GMD flight of steps tests — because the inevitable failures would cave its hindrance value against foreign attack .
And those GMD interceptor missiles already deployed in California and Alaska ? They do n’t sour , but the National Academy of Sciences has a spiffy theme on how to recycle them : transfer them from their silos and apply them as practice targets when the Missile Defense Agency at long last figures out a better system .
How Did This Happen?
If the GMD system were suddenly endowed with the power of manner of speaking , its first words would likely be those of Admiral James Stockdale : “ Who am I ? Why am I here ? ”
The response is President George W. Bush , who made structure of a internal antimissile system a precedency after take post . Beginning in 2001 , his administration spent million per year to develop various missile defense technologies . The White House picture a scaled - down interlingual rendition of President Ronald Reagan ’s “ Strategic Defense Initiative , ” which had sought to create a cuticle against a massive Soviet attack . The Bush brass favored a limited system , whose master use would be thwarting a small figure of ballistic projectile that might be fired at the United States by antagonist such as North Korea or Iran .
But , what ’s the best way to shoot down an incoming ballistic missile ? To answer that , you need to consider the integral trajectory path of an ICBM , from liftoff to reentry .
One pick is “ boost - phase intercept , ” when a missile has taken off and is still in the phase of speed up , powered flight . But this approach is especially challenging , since the fourth dimension period for tap the missile is typically between just 60 and 300 minute , look on the projectile ’s reach and propellant type . For instance , an intercontinental ballistic missile with a fluid fuel rocket salad motor launch from central Iran to the U.S. East Coast would have about 250 bit of boost - phase flight ( out of a total flight fourth dimension of approximately 40 min ) , whereas an ICBM solid fuel skyrocket motor launch from the same location would have about 180 instant of boost - phase flight .
Another downside , as note in the composition published by the National Academy of Sciences : “ Since boost - phase angle intercept is unlikely to destroy a nuclear warhead , the debris would not be just fragments of the attack garden rocket but potentially an inviolate , armed atomic arm . ” ( Ooops ! Sorry for drop that on you , Saudi Arabia )
At the opposite side of the spectrum is “ last defence intercept , ” which strikes at a missile during its final approach , when it has reentered the standard pressure ( at an altitude below 100 kilometers ) . But this approach also has downsides . For starter , the window for chance is limit ( 1 - 2 minute ) . More significantly , since the interceptors would be launch at such a tardy stage , they would only be able to protect a relatively humble area . So , covering big parts of the United States would take many more interceptors .
The third , most practicable selection , “ midcourse intercept , ” is the system of rules we are judge to develop now . This takes lieu after the intercontinental ballistic missile booster has burnt out , and the projectile , which is outside the atmosphere , is following a ballistic flight under the sole influence of Earth ’s gravitational field . This is the tenacious phase of a projectile ’s flight itinerary , allowing for more sentence to identify and tally the target — or , in the event of a miss , correct for errors and plunge additional interceptors . And , by striking relatively early , each interceptor can champion wider area of dominion . In theory , a few sites could safeguard the entire country .
But , there ’s that phrase again : “ in theory . ” In practice , the GMD midcourse intercept system ca n’t get the job done . The interceptors , as presently design , each deploy a warhead called the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle ( EKV ) , which flies into blank and strikes the target missile at velocities approaching 22,000 mph . The kinetic encroachment knocks out the incoming ICBM — a technique more ordinarily known as “ hit - to - kill . ” ( This is frequently compare to tally a hummer with a bullet . ) The EKV has failed during each of the three test flying comport since 2010 — which mean the interceptors presently deployed in our silo might as well be renamed “ sit around - to - pop . ”
Hide-and-Seek
Even if the kill fomite could be made to work , there still rest the challenge of locating the target .
Midcourse stop in distance earmark for the best opportunity to arrive at an incoming ICBM . But , it is also the good chance for the ICBM to deploy decoys — even light , hollow 1 — because , in blank , all object follow ballistic trajectories regardless of their plenty . This countermeasure would n’t be effective at lower elevation , because , when fall to Earth , weak objects slow down down faster due to atmospheric pull , make it much comfortable to separate between a decoy and an actual payload . In the vacuum cleaner of outer space , however , no such lot . The National Academy of Sciences account adduce this as the “ most formidable ” obstacle for the GMD organization to subdue .
The report express optimism that the projectile defense team political program would , eventually , obtain way to adapt to this challenge through the continual developing of counterpunch - countermeasures . in person , I ’m less confident . Reason one : The diversity of countermeasures — ranging from round-eyed lure to sophisticated electronic jam systems — demand a grade of adaptability that has n’t exactly been a strongpoint for the Missile Defense Agency . And , understanding two : Several engineering science that enable other res publica to build countermeasure are not subject to international exportation controls .
This 2nd point was addressed in a recently publishedRand report , which identified 19 different types of countermeasure that could potentially do good from technical school openly available on the global marketplace . It speaks volumes about the management of our missile defence programme that nobody had thought to expect into this likely trouble until now .
The term du jour for these countermeasures is “ insight assistance ” or “ penaids , ” for curt . Rand describes them as engineering that can be incorporated into an violative missile and used to “ saturate , confuse , evade , or curb ” an attempted projectile - defense lawyers interception .
A few sample of these engineering include :
Balloons : Objects that can be inflated in outer space — such as inflatable hotness shields ( picture below ) for space vehicle — could also be conform into inflatable decoys to befuddle missile vindication systems .
Maneuvering Subsystems : Exoatmospheric maneuvering subsystems can be used for the flying control condition of passive spacecraft — or they could be added to load , allowing them to move and debar interceptor .
fall towers : A vacuum drop tower is used for the terrestrial testing of items , permit them to go through zero soberness for several secondment . Such specialised facility could also be used for the developing and testing of insight aids .
For missile defensive structure to be in effect , the U.S. will require to build upon existing outside arrangement to tighten exportation control on multiple engineering science . ( And , that just includes logical trade . )
Yet , even lacking access to penaids , there are quite a little of potential , low - tech ways to fool around an interceptor . Two prominent critic of projectile defense , Cornell University ’s George Lewis and MIT ’s Theodore Postal , havewarnedthat an incoming missile could make decoys just by blowing apart bit of itself :
By using simple volatile proficiency to cut down the one - stage skyrocket - target into multiple pieces , a potential adversary could substantially further increase the chances that a … .. GMD interceptor would leave out the warhead . Iran and North Korea successfully demonstrate this cutting proficiency when they separated the stage in the multistage rocket they have already flown . The same could be done to the upper level of a multistage rocket to anticipate the homing of the GMD bolt down vehicle , creating the same mix-up of object to hold in the true location of the warhead from the GMD organization .
Now What?
If there is anything resemble consensus on GMD at this point it ’s that the Missile Defense Agency needs to go back to the drawing board and develop a viable kill vehicle before it can even lead off handle the multiple other challenge . To the extent that the media cover this story , you ’ll hear a lot of partizan bickering over who is to blame for this loser . Ignore it . The biggest trouble is not political , or perhaps even technological — it ’s institutional .
Few people have said it effective thanJeffrey Lewis — Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies — who recentlywrote :
Of the many things MDA has been called , highly competent is not one of them . This is an organization that has recently seen its chief executive director resign over accusations that he browbeat staff ; previously , he had to institutionalize a memo to his employee postulate them to spend less clock time surfing for porno … .
Part of the problem with MDA and its predecessor has been a de facto , then de jure , immunity from the normal convention of testing and procurement . In its account , MDA has transferred only a small number of systems to the services . In general , projectile defense team system have been repel by projectile defence enthusiasts , not the inspection and repair .
What would happen if missile defense programs were return to the service , and look to compete against other antecedence on basic grounds like “ toll - effectiveness ” ?
It ’s a good inquiry . But whether it ’s answered or not , Congress will likely still move onward with its plans to build GMD silos on the East Coast . You ’ll pardon me if I do n’t feel any safer .
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